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THE DAILY SCAM NEWSLETTER  |  SEPTEMBER 11, 2024

Co-Founder/Content: Doug Fodeman  |  Co-Founder/Creative: David Deutsch  |  V04N31

“I Lost Over $6100 to a Job Scam!”

On August 30, a 51-year old woman from Kentucky contacted The Daily Scam to report that she was victimized by a job scam. This victim lost a total of $6,176 to a very sophisticated and clever fraud on day five of her job trial period. One of the many things about this job scam that is so unique and different from the overwhelming majority of scams we see is that this woman actually earned $652 of “task” bonuses during her first four days of work. She was able to withdraw this money and deposit it into her personal bank account through an intermediary app required for use by her new employer, C3a.store. Her job, she was told, was to purchase various online products, and then post fake excellent reviews of these products. (Not exactly a nice thing to do!) At the end of each day, she was to be reimbursed for her purchases and given a bonus per purchase based on the amount she spent. She was given accounts to use on two supporting websites as a part of this employment. We found several hidden breadcrumbs in these websites that strongly suggest that these are Chinese-speaking cybercriminals working in Bangkok, Thailand. This fraud was exceptionally well-crafted and complex. Here is her story…

To protect this victim’s identity, we’ll call her Cindy. Cindy works in the management industry. However, she told us “I needed the extra income after my husband had an accident and we got behind on a few bills, as well as needing a new roof on our home so we can sell it.  I was going to look for seasonal work when this text came in.” On Sunday, August 25, just before noon, Cindy received a random text from 518-333-9982. A woman identified herself as “Alice from OfficeTeam (Robert Half).” There is, in fact, a job recruiting firm using the website RobertHalf.com. I spoke by phone with an employee named Taylor at the real Robert Half recruiting firm. She told me that their recruiting agency does not reach out to potential hires with an initial text, and that they do not use WhatsApp at all, especially to interview potential new hires. By the way, after being defrauded of thousands of dollars, Cindy texted Alice back to ask how Alice got her phone number. As you might guess, Alice never replied.

During the last few months, we’ve heard from dozens of people who have reported receiving similar random texts asking if the person was interested in a job opportunity. We have also received these random texts ourselves and if we show an interest to learn more about the job, the person with whom we’re texting always tells us that we will be contacted by a WhatsApp phone number to complete the job interview.  (Below you’ll find many more examples of random job scam texts recently received by people.) This is exactly what happened to Cindy. She was told she will be contacted from WhatApp number +1805-624-8221 within 24 hours for her job interview. About a half hour later Cindy received a WhatsApp text from the 805 number. This was now Sunday afternoon. The contact was a woman who identified herslelf as Lena. If this were a real job interview, it is extremely unlikely that it would have taken place on a Sunday or by text only! Cindy told us that one time, early in her training period, she requested a Facetime call with Lena. However, as Cindy describes it “the video was poor but I could make out a blond lady. There was no sound. It was only a few minutes long. She hung up and when i tried to call her back via FaceTime on WhatsApp she didn’t answer. She said she dropped her phone in the tub and was having issues with it. Any other time I asked her to call me she never did.” This is another very serious red flag that should be a warning sign to anyone having a job interview! Text-only conversations are scammer’s effort to hide their true identity! “Dropping a phone into water” is a commonly used excuse by scammers as to why they are having problems with video chats.

In her profile photo on Whatsapp, Lena presented as a young, beautiful woman in a tan coat seated in front of a famous pond and statue in Buen Metiro Park in Madrid, Spain. The statue in the distance is called the monument to Alfonso XII. Lena claimed to represent the California AI company named C3.ai. Cindy told us that her interview with Lena was about 45 minutes long before she was hired by this company. The real C3.ai was founded in 2009 and their website domain is C3.ai. Their company’s icon appears as a small c tucked into a larger number 3. This is the exact icon that was used repeatedly on the “company” website in which Cindy was trained and conducted her online work for several days. However, what Cindy didn’t realize is that her work for C3.ai was actually conducted on a malicious mimic website at C3a.store. The c3a.store domain was registered in Beijing, China on July 10, 2024, about 6 weeks before Cindy was “hired” by this company.

As Lena explained, Cindy’s “job” was to select online products presented to her within her c3a.store account, purchase them and write a glowing review, typically giving each item 5 stars. This required that she deposit her own money into the company account, using a well-known app called CashApp. (CashApp states on their website that they are a “financial services platform” and not a bank. This app can be used to transfer funds to/from traditional banks and for the purchase and sale of digital currency such as Bitcoin. It is a legitimate app but used as a tool to support this fraud.) At first, Cindy was suspicious about this requirement for her to move money from her own bank into her c3a.store account using CashApp. However, the initial money requirement was $36 and the potential return was an additional $14, creating a balance of $50 in her account. She decided to take a chance. She worked for about an hour an one-half later that Sunday evening to complete a given set of “tasks” and saw her account balance increase to $50. The next day, to make sure this was legitimate, Cindy tried to withdraw that $50 from her c3a.store account and deposit it back into her personal bank account. It worked within minutes! On Tuesday, August 27 she felt more confident that this was a legitimate job, though it’s payment process was odd. To continue making purchases at the next “starting” level for products, her next set of tasks required her to deposit $117 of her own money. She then completed these product review tasks presented to her and the next day she successfully withdrew $185.90. This withdrawal amounted to a bonus of $68.90 after the $117 she had provided. Keep in mind that these bonus earnings were in addition to the wages that she was promised to be paid at the end of her 5-day trial period.  Her first salary payment was expected to be $500 on day 5 with a promise of a significant increase by day 15.  The money deposited into her c3a.store account came after she completed 2 sets of tasks for 5 days. Each task set contained 40 items to be purchased and reviewed.

It’s important to note several things about this fraud…

  1. Cindy told us that during the interview process with Lena and introductory texts with Alice, she was never told that she would be required to provide her own funds into the company account. She said “Not until the training. If i kept my balance as $50 that i would not get any large lucky orders like she did. The more money i kept in the account the more the lucky order would be.  They gave me the original $50 as well [on her first hours of work].”

2. As a part of her “training” for this job, Cindy was given access to an employee chat group that appeared to have 37 people in it. All of them were doing the same “work” she was doing. During these chat sessions she saw communications about their work, also joking around between employees who claimed to have been doing this work for 2-3 years. They exchanged funny emoji’s and, most importantly, assured Cindy that this movement of money from her bank into the store account was normal and OK.  Several of these employees told Cindy that they got their money back, plus salary, bonuses and incentives! This chat group was completely manipulative and a clever effort of the scammers to trick Cindy into moving over more than $6000 of her own money into the c3a.store account!

3. Much like the popular myth that a frog will not jump out of water that is slowly heated (It is not true), Cindy’s heat was turned up slowly each time she completed a set of tasks. The products became costlier to purchase and review. However, her incentive was that she could make even more money by doing so! The iodiom “in for a penny, in for a pound” also fits because Cindy had already invested small amounts of her money and seemed on her way to making larger amounts.

4. The scammers further incentivized victims to put in more money to their accounts by offering additional bonuses! For example, if they moved $1000 into their c3a.store accounts, they would earn $177, if they moved $3000 into their accounts, they would earn a $777 bonus.

5. Another tool used by these scammers was a “Customer Service” chat resource. This chat service was connected to her c3a.store account but linked to a domain called wchatlink.com.  This domain was also newly registered a few months earlier, on June 20, 2024. At any time, Cindy was able to connect to a customer service representative to ask a question. Several days after starting her job, the CashApp service flagged her account when she tried to move a large deposit from her personal bank over to c3a.store! Cindy said “they did not close my account but just said that they suspected fraudulent activity and that they would stop transactions.” When she reported this problem to Customer Service at wchatlink.com, they instructed her how to move her funds over using Paypal! Cindy didn’t see the CashApp notice as a serious red flag! Nor did she grow concerned when she asked to speak via phone with someone at Customer Service. Cindy told us “the one time I tried to call customer service they told me via text that if they answered for me they would not be able to help other people who needed help.”  This may appear as reasonable but we see it as another red flag!

Finally, on Day 5 of her work trial, her $500 bonus came into her account. She was so relieved because, as she told us, this job was making her increasingly anxious because of the rising costs of reviewing costlier products! Her completion of some tasks had also moved her into “VIP Status 1” and then “VIP Status 2,” meaning that she was skilled enough to review and cover more costly products. By the latter half of Day 5 she just wanted to finish her set of tasks to be done and then cash out the next day! But toward the very end of her set of tasks, she was hit with three “Lucky Orders.” These were called lucky orders because the earning potential was significant! She could make thousands of dollars by completing them. The first lucky order was for the purchase of six Breitling Superocean White Watches for a total cost of $20,669.00! To complete this task, she was asked to move about $12,369 of her own money into her c3a.store account to cover the purchases! That request was well beyond all of her financial resources! She complained repeatedly to Customer Service and to Lena. That’s when Customer Service told her that the merchant using this service would offer Cindy a $3710 credit to her account, bringing her cost to purchase the product down to $16,959. Her account currently held about $8,659 in it and it wasn’t enough. She was asked to add another $8,300, after the merchant credit. (She had been asked to add $12,369 before the credit!)  Keep in mind that of the $8,659 already in her c3a.store account, $6,176.00 was her own money she had already moved over from her personal banking account!

This huge financial request was more than Cindy could cope with. She told us she was now extremely stressed because her work account at c3a.store would not allow her to withdraw any of her funds, or  continue until this “lucky order” was completed. Speaking with Lena or Customer Service did not change this demand. That’s when she started thinking seriously that this job might be a scam. Cindy started doing some online searches for information about this company and her job. Her search somehow lead her to an article we published in our March 20 newsletter titled Talking With a Scammer Who Doesn’t Know She is a Scammer! Cindy contacted us. Via a Zoom call, Cindy gave us a complete tour of her employee c3a.store account. We quickly confirmed that her “job” was a fraud and sadly, she was not going to be able to recover her funds.

This loss felt devastating to Cindy but now she was also angry and wanted to tell her story. She told us “I feel so stupid…. I was leery. But everything Lena said was to happen was happening…till it wasn’t. My husband was even going to do this with me as soon as I could invite people. [The website had a paragraph telling employees that they could earn additional commission if they successfully brought in more job applicants who were then hired.]  It looked legit even if I questioned my morals on what the actual job was. I have reported this fraud to the FTC, IC3 and the Kentucky Attorney General.”

We asked Cindy if she would be willing to gather more evidence for us as to who was behind this fraud, and she immediately said yes! With our encouragement, Cindy was able to get Lena to answer her phone to discuss the money that she was asked to move into the Wallet Account to complete her “task.” Cindy told us that Lena had an “oriental accent.” [i.e. an Asian accent.] We were able to confirm that the creators of this fraud likely spoke Chinese because we found multiple instances of Chinese characters hidden in some of the code used to build the c3a.store website. As a type of Hail Mary pass to confirm our suspicions, we gave Cindy a tracking link and a suggestion how she could try to trick a “Customer Service” representative into clicking it. Cindy executed the plan brilliantly and within 4 seconds of delivering that link, we had 2 clicks showing that the people behind this part of the fraud were located in Bangkok, Thailand! A Google search tells us that Chinese is the third most spoken language in Thailand so it is possible that everyone involved in this fraud is located in that country. However, we have discovered that other cybercriminal gangs will hire people in parts of Asia to play a part in their fraud schemes. Remember our Top Story in the March 20 newsletter? The woman I communicated with claimed that she was just doing her job recruiting new hires and didn’t know that she was part of a scam. Therefore it is also possible that the “Customer Service” representatives who clicked the tracking links from Bangkok, Thailand were cheap labor hired to add legitimacy to this fraud. Perhaps the real scammers are indeed Chinese cybercriminals in China? Unfortunately, we don’t know for certain.

To see the many examples of bogus texts about jobs that were sent to us by our readers recently, scroll down to our Textplosion column.

Last week we heard from another woman who also suffered a small loss from a job scam that targeted her. This scam was of a type we are very familiar with and have reported about it in this feature article. (The article describes details of this fraud, as well as more than two hundred samples!)  This is what the woman told us about her recent loss for a job supposedly at Luxoft Company… ”Initial contact was on Facebook and I was told to download the Telegram App then given a link and code to contact the hiring manager. I was asked several questions. I will say they are very convincing. They had me hold….then came back, told me how impressed they were and I was hired. They were going to send me thousands of dollars in Apple equipment (from one of their vendors) and I would receive as soon as my portal was complete. I was getting suspicious but I had not given any banking, credit card or SSN so I’m still on the hook. They told me to hold, came back and said they would like me to start asap but to complete my portal I would need an Apple Card to pay for installation of the equipment when delivered but I would be reimbursed. Yep…I sent them $200.00 via PayPal. The next morning I informed them I was declining the job offer and sent a PayPal request for the 200.00 which they cancelled. I sent Luxoft a msg advising them of the scam using their company but they haven’t responded. They [the scammers] told me to choose friends & family on my paypal payment which means there is no fraud protection. Paypal advised I go to my banking institution to make a report and claim. I plan to do that tomorrow. I’d gladly give up the money to see they are prosecuted but that’s probably not going to happen. At best, I’ll get my money back but it’s probably a 200.00 lesson. Than goodness I’m a quick study. I’m still getting messages…she told me she didn’t sleep well last night from worrying about my money. They have nerve too.” This woman also agreed to try and trick the scammers into clicking a tracking link. She was successful! Her scammers clicked it 8 times, showing that they were located in Lagos, Nigeria!

With just two months until the Presidential election, we are seeing a significant uptick in the amount of malicious clickbait pretending to be politically related merchandise (all of them are in support of Donald Trump), and in disinformation campaigns to influence our democratic elections. For example, the Department of Justice has now revealed charges against Tenet Media because this company has served as a “front.” It was set up and financed by Russia in an effort to influence Americans. Check out this article on AP News:

https://apnews.com/article/russian-interference-presidential-election-influencers-trump-999435273dd39edf7468c6aa34fad5dd

This news that Russia is once again trying to influence our elections should come as no surprise to our readers. That is also why our Justice Department is taking action against Russia. Last Wednesday, the US Justice Department announced measures being taken to try to make it harder for Russia to do this. Check out this article on the New York Times…

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/09/04/us/politics/russia-election-influence.html

But in case you didn’t know, Russia in not our only worry when it comes to misinformation and disinformation campaigns to influence our elections. Iran is also working hard to destroy our Democracy and divide our country. Check out any of these recent articles….

https://www.politico.com/news/2024/09/06/iranian-linked-websites-set-up-targeting-us-minority-veteran-voters-00177727

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/09/04/business/media/iran-disinformation-us-presidential-race.html

https://apnews.com/article/iran-russia-china-election-disinformation-hacking-ee65e29b866852b146e75c9f3312a1ae

On a lighter note, sometimes fraudsters come up with the craziest ideas to try to scam you! This next email is the perfect example and made us laugh. We hope it does the same for you! (We think that the 2nd paragraph is one looooong run-on sentence!)

In our August 14 newsletter’s Top Story, Attack of the Killer Women, we wrote about the experiences of a few men on the community website Nextdoor.com. These men were heavily targeted by pig-butchering scammers who presented as beautiful women. One of the men informed us that he continues to be targeted, and continues to report these newly created Nextdoor accounts to the service. Fortunately, Nextdoor has been very responsive and has removed every reported account within 24 hours or less! This particular scammer starts by contacting the man and suggesting that they used to be neighbors. He didn’t buy it but she continued with her narrative anyway…

Below are two more articles about scams that may interest our readers, including a scam that targets people on Facebook by using fake live-streamed funerals!

https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2024/08/27/minnesota-magazine-scam-2-sentenced-in-300-million-64-person-case/74971581007/

https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2024/08/fake-funeral-live-stream-scams-target-grieving-users-on-facebook

Remember to check out our new podcast on September 15th. I spoke with a school network administrator to learn how he has identified attacks by hackers to his network and how he has kept his school community safe! https://www.securewon.com/resources/podcasts/

OneDrive Login and Paypal Email

One of our longtime readers sent us this email he received about a supposed accounting department invoice. It claimed that the invoice was put into Micrsoft’s OneDrive cloud storage. However, the link pointed to X’s (formerly Twitter) link shortening service at t.co!  The link was set to forward the man to a phishing page set up on a website called zephyrane[.]com.  The web page that greeted the man looked exactly like the signin page for OneDrive! Don’t believe everything you see online!

Phishermen continue to misuse services like Paypal to send their phishing emails. Yes, this next email did come from Paypal.com and the link points back to Paypal.com. However, it is all a lie! Most importantly, look at the “Note from seller” shown in the email.  866-984-1887 is NOT Paypal’s customer service number. It is a scammer’s number!

Your Money: Selling a Used Computer & a Scammer’s Instagram Ad/Website

On September 1, a Reddit member said “I’ve listed a MacBook for sale on Craigslist and Facebook and have gotten a few offers, but most want shipping. This [text] came up and I was wondering if it is legit or not.” The seller told the interested buyer via text that the laptop was still available. This is the reply he got and it is filled with serious red flags that he’s communicating with a scammer!  When posting something for sale online, we strongly recommend that you include the following language….  CASH ONLY! No digital payments, no shipping of item and local pick up only. (Scammers NOT welcome!)

    Last week a man was scrolling through his Instagram account and came across this advertisement claiming to be for Rapha, an online store selling bicycles and biking accessories. The link lead to an online store at rapha-bicycle[.]shop. But the real business address for Rapha bicycle gear is rapha.cc and NOT rapha-bicycle[.]shop!

    The discounts offered on rapha-bicycle[.]shop were incredible, some as high as 93% off!  You know the expression “if it seems too good to be true, it is!” At the bottom of the scam web page in the lower corner, the site says they have a 4.8 Star rating with Trustpilot. Of course, when we visited Trustpilot and put in their website domain rapha-bicycle[.]shop, for Rapha Bicycle, Trustpilot says “no reviews.”  Scam ads often appear on social media sites like Instagram, Facebook and elsewhere. Don’t trust these sites to protect you from fraud. They can’t!

    Explosion of Job Scams Delivered via Texts!

    As we stated in this week’s Top Story, fake job scams have exploded onto people’s phones as texts. The number of readers, friends and family members reporting them to us is off the charts! Below are eleven recent examples. Check out our suggestions in the last collection on what you might do to push back against these fraudsters!

    Until next week, surf safely!

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